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Abstract
This thesis presents a report on original research, extending a result published
as joint work with Merschen and von Stengel in Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics [4]. We present a polynomial time algorithm for two problems on
labeled Gale strings, a combinatorial structure introduced by Gale [11] that
can be used in the representation of a particular class of games.
These games were used by Savani and von Stengel [25] as an example of
exponential running time for the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm to find a
Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game [16]. It was therefore conjectured that
solving these games was a complete problem in the class PPAD (Polynomial
Parity Argument, Directed version, see Papadimitriou [24]). In turn, a major
motivation for the definition of PPAD was the study of complementary pivoting
methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Our result, unexpectedly, sets apart this class of games as a case where a
Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. Since Daskalakis, Goldberg
and Papaditrimiou [6] and Chen and Deng [5] proved that finding a Nash
equilibrium in general normal-form games is PPAD-complete, we have a
special class of games, unless PPAD = P.
Our proof exploits two results. As seen in Savani and von Stengel [25] [26],
we represent the Nash equilibria of these special games as Gale strings. We
then give a graph where the perfect matchings correspond to Nash equilibria
via Gale strings, and we exploit Edmonds’ polynomial-time algorithm for a
perfect matching in a graph [7]. The proof given in Casetti, Merschen and
von Stengel [4] covered only the case of even-dimensional Gale strings; here
we extend the result to the general case.
Merschen [19] and Ve´gh and von Stengel [28] expanded on our ideas,
proving further results on the index of Nash equilibria (see Shapley [27]) in the
framework of “oiks” introduced by Edmonds [8] and Edmonds and Sanita` [9].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis centers on a problem in the field of algorithmic game theory, which
concerns the study of strategic interactions from the point of view of computer
science. Our result is an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium in polynomial
time for games in a special class, called Gale games.
Gale games can be represented through a combinatorial structure called
Gale strings (Gale [11]), using a construction (Savani and von Stengel [25])
on labeled polytopes derived from the game itself (Lemke and Howson [16],
Shapley [27]). This connection was used to construct games for which the
classic Lemke-Howson Algorithm (Lemke and Howson [16]) takes exponential
running time to find a Nash equilibrium (Savani and von Stengel [25]). The
Lemke-Howson Algorithm gives a quite straightforward proof of how finding
a Nash equilibrium of any two-player game is a problem in the class PPAD
(Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version; Papadimitriou [24]). The
PPAD-completeness of the problem has been proven (Daskalakis, Goldberg
and Papadimitriou [6], Chen and Deng [5]), but the result required the use
of approximate -Nash equilibria. We conjectured that the combinatorial
representation of Gale games could be exploited to give an alternative and
purely discrete proof of PPAD-completeness. Eventually, our result turned
out to point in the opposite direction: unless PPAD = P, Gale games are
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indeed a case apart, but because of their tractability, not because of their
hardness.
The remainder of this chapter will cover some basic definitions and notation
that will be used throughout the thesis, concerning polytopes (see Ziegler [32]
for details) in section 1.1, basic game theory (see Myerson [21]) in section
1.2, and computational complexity (see Papadimitriou [23]) in section 1.3.
Chapter 2 will deal with the geometric and combinatorial constructions leading
to the definition of Gale games. In section 2.1 we will see the representation
of Nash equilibria of 2-player games as facets or vertices of polytopes built
from the game itself. In section 2.2 we will define Gale strings and give the
proof of Gale’s theorem, showing the representation of cyclic polytopes as
Gale strings. Section 2.3 will then translate the framework of section 2.1
to the point of view of Gale strings, introducing Gale games. In Chapter 3
we will tackle the computational complexity of the issues arising from the
previous chapter. After an introduction to the complexity classes related to
proofs by parity argument in section 3.1, we will present different versions of
the Lemke-Howson algorithm in section 3.2. Finally, in section 3.3, we will
present our original result, solving Gale games in polynomial time. A last
chapter will relate further results in the field and open problems.
1.1 Vectors and Polytopes
We will often need to refer to sets of natural numbers. We follow the notation
[n] = {i ∈ N | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We denote the transpose of a matrix A as A>. Vectors will be considered
as column vectors, so u>v is the scalar product of u, v ∈ Rd. A vector for
which all components are 0’s will be denoted as 0. A vector for which all
components are 1’s will be denoted as 1. The i-th component of the i-th unit
vector ei is equal to 1, whereas all its other components are 0. An inequality
of the form u ≥ v is intended to hold for every component.
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An affine combination of points in an Euclidean space zi ∈ Rd, where
i ∈ [m], is ∑i∈[m] λizi where λi ∈ R such that ∑i∈[m] λi = 1. The points zi
are affinely independent if none of them is an affine combination of the others.
A convex combination of the points zi is such an affine combination with λi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ [m]. The convex hull of a set Z of points is the set of all its convex
combinations. We denote it as conv(Z), so
conv{zi | i ∈ [m]} = {
∑
i
λizi | λi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [m],
∑
i
λi = 1} .
A set of points Z is convex if Z = conv(Z). It has dimension d if it contains
exactly d + 1 affinely independent points. The convex hull of d + 1 points of
dimension d is called a d-simplex. The standard d-simplex is the convex hull
of the first d+ 1 unit vectors, that is, ∆d = conv{ei | i ∈ [d+ 1]}.
A polytope is the convex hull of a finite set of points, not necessarily affinely
independent. Its dimension is its dimension as a convex set. A polyhedron is
the intersection of finitely many closed halfspaces {x ∈ Rd | a>x ≤ a0}.
It can be shown that a bounded polyhedron is a polytope. A vertex of a
d-dimensional polytope P = conv(Z) is a point z ∈ Z that is not the convex
combination of other points in P . An edge of P is a 1-dimensional line segment
that has two vertices as endpoints. A facet of P is a set of dimension d − 1
that is the convex hull of a set of vertices that lie on a hyperplane of the
form {x ∈ Rd | a>x = a0} so that a>u < a0 for all other vertices u of
P . A d-dimensional polytope P is simplicial if it is the convex hull of a set
of at least d + 1 points v ∈ Rd such that no d + 1 of them are on a common
hyperplane. This is equivalent to requiring that every facet of P is a d-simplex.
A d-dimensional polytope P is simple if every point of P lies on at most d
facets. Notice that the points lying on exactly d facets are exactly the vertices.
Consider a polytope P which has 0 in its interior and is given by n inequalities
with normal vectors ci for i ∈ [n] according to
P = {x ∈ Rd | c>i x ≤ 1, i ∈ [n] }.
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Then the polar of the polytope P is denoted by P∆, where
P∆ = conv{ci | i ∈ [n] }.
If P is a polytope and contains the origin 0, the polar of its polar is P itself,
P∆∆ = P . Furthermore, if P is simplicial then P∆ is simple, and vice versa.
For details see Ziegler [32].
1.2 Normal Form Games and Nash Equilibria
The idea of game as model of strategic interaction was first introduced by von
Neumann [29]. A finite normal form game is Γ = (P, S, u) where both P and
S are finite. Here P is the set of players, and S = ×p∈PSp is the set of pure
strategy profiles, where Sp is the set of pure strategies of player p. The aim of
each player p ∈ P is to maximize their payoff function up : S → R. The vector
of payoffs is u = ×p∈Pup. By “game” we will always mean “finite normal form
game.” A mixed strategy of player p is a probability distribution on Sp. It can
be described as a point on the (|Sp| − 1)-dimensional mixed strategy simplex
∆p = {x ∈ R|Sp| | x ≥ 0, 1>x = 1}.
The set of mixed strategy profiles is the simplicial polytope ∆ = ×p∈P∆p.
We extend the payoff functions to up : ∆ → R linearly. A Nash equilibrium
of a game is a strategy profile in which each player cannot improve their
expected payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy; such a strategy is
called a best response. Notice that applying a positive affine transformation to
all the payoffs does not change the Nash equilibria of the game. The following
“best-response condition” is useful and easy to show (e.g., Nash [22]).
Proposition 1.1. A mixed strategy x ∈ ∆p is a best response against some
mixed strategy profile y ∈ ×q 6=p∆q of the other players if and only if every pure
strategy si ∈ Sp chosen with positive probability in x is a best response to y.
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The existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by the fundamental
theorem by Nash ([22]). Notice that there can be more than one equilibrium.
Theorem 1. (Nash [22]) Every finite game in normal form has at least one
Nash equilibrium.
Bimatrix games are games with only two players. They can be described
by two m × n payoff matrices A and B, where aij and bij are the payoffs
of respectively player 1 and of player 2 when the former plays her ith pure
strategy and the latter plays his jth pure strategy, and m = |S1| and n = |S2|.
A bimatrix game is zero-sum if B = −A, and symmetric if B = A>. We
give two classic examples of bimatrix games: the prisoners’ dilemma and the
coordination game.
Example 1.1. In the symmetric non zero-sum prisoners’ dilemma of Table 1.1,
each player must decide whether to “help” the other one or to “betray” them.
If both players help each other, they will get a small reward. If both betray,
they will pay a small penalty. If one betrays and the other cooperate the
former will get a large reward and the latter will pay a large penalty. The only
equilibrium is the profile in which both players betray. If player 2 betrays, the
best response of player 1 is to betray, since it gives her payoff 1 instead of 0.
If player 2 helps, her payoff for betraying is 3 and her payoff for helping is 2,
so betraying is again the best response. The same holds for player 2, so at the
equilibrium both players will betray.
@
@
1
2
betray
help
betray help
1 3
1 0
0 2
3 2
Table 1.1 The prisoners’ dilemma.
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Table 1.2 shows a coordination game. Both players can drive on either a
mountain or a valley road. They lose if they drive on the same road and win if
they avoid each other, regardless of which road they take. The pure strategy
Nash equilibria are (mountain, valley) and (valley, mountain). There is also
a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies which can be represented as the
vectors of probabilities ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)).
@
@
1
2
mountain
valley
mountain valley
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
Table 1.2 A coordination game.
1.3 Computational Problems and Complexity
We base this section on the definitions in Papadimitriou [23], to which we refer
for further details.
A deterministic Turing machine M (we will imply the “deterministic”
from now on) is a representation of an algorithm that takes an input, runs a
algorithm manipulating the input on a tape, and returns an output when it
comes to a halting state (if it ever does).
The tape and its manipulation can be seen as follows: initially the tape
contains the input, given by a first symbol B followed by a finite string of
symbols x ∈ (Σ \ {unionsq})∗, where Σ is the alphabet of symbols of M and unionsq is
a special symbol representing the blank string. The program is then carried
on: a cursor starts at the first symbol and follows the algorithm given by
a transition function δ. The transition function depends on the current state
p ∈ K and the current symbol σ ∈ Σ: the former is the “instruction” to follow,
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the latter the symbol in the position of the cursor. The transition function
returns the next state q ∈ K, the symbol τ ∈ Σ to be written at the position
of the cursor, and a direction in which the cursor will move on the tape. The
possible directions are “left”, “right”, or “stay”, represented respectively by
←,→,−. The first symbol is never overwritten, and from there the cursor can
only go left.
In some cases, the machine reaches the state Yes (the machine accepts the
input), No (the machine rejects the input) or the halting state h after a finite
amount of time. The output is then given by M(x) = Yes or M(x) = No if
the machine accepts or rejects the input. If the halting state h is reached, the
output is M(x) = y, where y is the finite (possibly empty) string of symbols
that is left on the tape after the symbol B and before any string of unionsq’s at the
end. It is also possible that the machine doesn’t halt on input x; we denote
this case as M(x) =↗.
A problem P that requires an output that is either “Yes” or “No” is
a decision problem; its complement is the problem P that outputs “No” for
each instance of P that outputs “Yes”, and vice versa. A problem where the
output can be a string M(x) = y on the output tape as above is a function
problem; note that no guarantee on the halting state is required. If the output
is a string M(x) = y satisfying a relation R(x, y) or the input is rejected if
it is not possible to find any such string, the problem is a search problem. A
search problem where the input is never rejected is a total function problem.
By Theorem 1, the problem n-Nash of Table 1.3 is a total function problem.
n-Nash
input : A n-player game.
output: A Nash equilibrium of the game.
Table 1.3 The problem n-Nash.
15
Formally, a Turing machine isM = (K,Σ, δ, s), where K and Σ are finite,
Σ ∩ K = ∅ and Σ always contains the symbols unionsq and B. The transition
function is δ, defined as follows, where {←,→,−} * (K ∪ Σ):
δ : K × Σ −→ (K ∪ {h, Yes, No})× Σ× {←,→,−}.
A slightly different, although equivalent, model allows for multiple strings:
k ∈ N cursors move on k strings σi ∈ Σ∗; the states are still represented as
p ∈ K. The input is given in the tape of the first string; assuming the machine
halts, the output is given in the tape of the k-th string.
A language is a set of strings of symbols L ⊆ (Σ \ {unionsq})∗; a class is a
set of languages. Let M be a Turing machine, and let x ∈ (Σ \ {unionsq})∗. We
say that M decides L if either M(x) = Yes if x ∈ L or M(x) = No if
x /∈ L. A Turing machine M accepts L if x ∈ L is a necessary and sufficient
condition for M(x) = Yes, and if x /∈ L then M(x) = No or M does not
halt. Finally, M computes a function f : (Σ \ {unionsq})∗ → Σ∗ if M(x) = f(x) for
every x ∈ (Σ \ {unionsq})∗.
Let P1 be a problem and let x be an instance of P1 that is encoded in |x|
bits. P1 reduces to the problem P2 in polynomial time if there exists a function
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, a Turing machine M, and a polynomial p such that for
all x ∈ {0, 1}∗
1. x ∈ P1 ⇐⇒ f(x) ∈ P2;
2. M computes f(x);
3. M stops after p(|x|) steps.
For any class C of decision problems, the class of all complements of the
problems in C is the complement class co− C. A problem P is hard for a class
C if every problem in C is polynomial-time reducible to P ; that is, if P is at
least as hard to solve as every problem in C. A complete problem for the class
C is a C−hard problem that is also in C. Intuitively, if P1 is polynomial-time
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reducible to P2, it takes polynomial time to “translate” P1 to P2, and then to
“translate back” a solution of P2 as a solution of P1. This is particularly useful
if P2 is hard: then the problem P1 is at least as “difficult”. Furthermore, if the
problem P2 is also complete in a class C, it can be used as a test of belonging
to the class C.
The complexity class P (polynomial-time) contains all the polynomially
decidable problems, that is, all problems P such that there exists a Turing
machine M that outputs either Yes or No for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of P
after p(|x|) steps, where p is a polynomial. A problem P belongs to the class
NP (non-deterministic polynomial-time) if there exists a Turing machine M
and polynomials p1, p2 such that
1. for all x ∈ P there exists a certificate y ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that |y| ≤ p1(|x|);
2. M accepts the combined input xy, stopping after at most p2(|x| + |y|)
steps;
3. for all x /∈ P there does not exist y ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that M accepts the
combined input xy.
An equivalent definition gives NP as the class of all languages L for which the
binary relation R(x, y) such that L = {x | R(x, y) holds for some y} satisfies
the following conditions:
1. (polynomially balanced) if (x, y) ∈ R then |y| ≤ |x|k for some k ∈ N;
2. (polynomially decidable) if there is a Turing machine that decides L in
polynomial time.
Informally, a decision problem is in P if the answer to its question can be
found in a number of steps that is polynomial in the input of the problem,
and a decision problem is in NP if it takes polynomial time to verify whether
the “certificate” y is, indeed, a correct answer to the question posed by the
problem. Notice that there may be many different certificates for each instance
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of a problem. Consider for instance the NP problem Hamilton Path, defined
as “given an input graph x, is it possible to find a Hamiltonian path y of x?”
There are graphs with more than one possible Hamiltonian path, and each
one of these can be used as certificate.
It is quite simple to see that P ⊆ NP, but it is an important open problem
whether the inclusion is strict. If this were not the case, it could be argued
that there isn’t any substantial difference between finding a solution and
verifying its validity. This seems to contradict most of the human intellectual
experience, where the value of an “original” discovery is perceived as fundamental;
the “conventional” view is therefore that P 6= NP. Another open problem
is whether NP = co−NP; again, this is widely believed to be false. Notice
that if NP 6= co−NP then also P ( NP, but not vice versa.
The classes FP and FNP are analogous to P and NP, respectively, but
for function problems instead of decision problems. Formally, FNP (function
non-deterministic polynomial-time) is defined in Megiddo and Papadimitriou
[18] as the class of problems of the form “given an x ∈ Σ∗, find y ∈ Σ∗ such
that (x, y) ∈ R, where R is a polynomially balanced binary relation, or reject
the input.” FP (function polynomial-time) is the class of all FNP problems
that can be solved in polynomial time. As in the case of decision problems,
it is not known whether FP = FNP; the question is actually equivalent to
whether P = NP. Megiddo and Papadimitriou [18] also define the class
TFNP (total function non-deterministic polynomial-time) as the class of all
FNP problems where for every x ∈ Σ∗ a solution y ∈ Σ∗ is guaranteed to exist.
From another point of view, TFNP = F(NP ∩ co−NP), and the existence
of a TFNP-complete problem would imply that NP = co−NP. The lack of
TFNP-complete problems has led to define a number of new classes; we will
see more of this in section 3.1.
The class #P is the class of all function problems that output the number
of possible certificates for a decision problem in NP. Formally: the counting
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problem associated with a binary relation Q(x, y) is “given x, how many y are
there such that (x, y) ∈ Q?” Then #P is the class of all counting problems
associated with binary relations that are both polynomially balanced and
polynomially decidable. It is interesting to notice that there are #P-complete
problems for which the corresponding search problem can be solved in polynomial
time. An example close to the topic of this thesis is given in Brightwell [2]:
although finding an Eulerian circuit in an undirected graph takes polynomial
time, counting the number of possible circuits in the same graph is complete
in #P.
Finally, the class PSPACE is the set of decision problems that can be
solved by a Turing machine using an amount of tape space that is polynomial
in the size of the input; although it can be proven that NP ⊆ PSPACE, the
possibility of an identity is yet another open problem.
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Chapter 2
Labels, Polytopes and Gale
Strings
In the remainder of this thesis we focus on bimatrix games. We identify the
game with its payoff matrices (A,B), and we assume that both A and B are
non-negative, and that neither A nor B> has a zero column; this can be done
without loss of generality, by adding a constant to all entries in A and B if
necessary.
We start by showing a construction to represent a bimatrix game as two
simplices subdivided in labeled regions such that the Nash equilibria of the
game correspond to “completely labeled” points of the simplices. This idea
is due to Lemke and Howson [16]. As in Balthasar [1] and Savani and von
Stengel [26], that together with Savani and von Stengel [25] constitute the
main source of material for this chapter as a whole, we follow the very clear
approach given by Shapley [27].
From labeled regions we then move on to an equivalent formulation in
terms of “best response” polytopes; a result by McLennan and Tourky [17] on
a special case of games, called imitation games, and its extension to the more
general unit vector games, due to Balthasar [1] and Savani and von Stengel
[26], allows us to simplify this construction. The problem 2-Nash can then
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be reduced to a problem on the facets or vertices of a labeled polytope, under
some simple conditions.
Finally, we further restrict our scope to Gale games, that is, unit vector
games for which the polytopes in the previous section can be represented by
a combinatorial structure called Gale strings. In the second section of this
chapter we define Gale strings and we study how they correspond to a special
case of polytopes, called cyclic polytopes, as proven by Gale [11]. The third
and last section will combine the results of the previous ones with a definition
of labeling for Gale strings; this will lead to a reduction from the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium of a Gale game to the problem of finding a complete
labeling for a Gale string.
2.1 Bimatrix Games and Labels
Let (A,B) be bimatrix game, and let X = ∆1 and Y = ∆2 be the mixed
strategy simplices of player 1 and 2, respectively, that is,
X = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, 1>x = 1},
Y = { y ∈ Rn | y ≥ 0, 1>y = 1}.
(2.1)
A labeling of the sets X and Y assigns to each x ∈ X and y ∈ Y a set of labels,
which is a subset of [m+ n], as follows:
1. the m pure strategies of player 1 are denoted as i ∈ [m];
2. the n pure strategies of player 2 are denoted as m+ j with j ∈ [n];
3. each mixed strategy x ∈ X of player 1 has
• label i for each i ∈ [m] such that xi = 0,
• label m + j for each j ∈ [n] such that the j-th pure strategy of
player 2 is a best response to x;
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4. each mixed strategy y ∈ Y of player 2 has
• label m+ j for each j ∈ [n] such that yj = 0,
• label i for each i ∈ [m] such that the i-th pure strategy of player 1
is a best response to y.
This labeling can be used to characterize the Nash equilibria of the game: A
pair (x, y) is called completely labeled if each possible label in [m+n] is a label
of x or of y.
Theorem 2. (Shapley [27]) Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Then (x, y) is a Nash
equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A,B) if and only if (x, y) is completely
labeled.
Proof. The mixed strategy x ∈ X has label m+ j for some j ∈ [n] if and only
if the j-th pure strategy of player 2 is a best response to x. By Proposition
1.1, this is a necessary and sufficient condition for player 2 to play his j-th
strategy at every equilibrium where player 1 chooses x. The analogous holds
for the strategies y ∈ Y and player 1 playing her i-th strategy in response
to player 2 choosing y. Therefore, at an equilibrium (x, y) all labels m + j,
with j ∈ [n], appear either as labels of x or of y. Conversely, if (x, y) is not
completely labeled, then some label does not appear as a label of x or y. This
label represents a pure strategy that is played with positive probability but is
not a best response, which contradicts the equilibrium property.
A useful graphical representation of labels on the simplices X and Y is
done by labeling the outside of each simplex according to the player’s own
pure strategies that are not played, and by subdividing its interior into closed
polyhedral sets, called best response regions, that correspond to the other
player’s pure best responses. We give an example of this construction.
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Example 2.1. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) Consider the 3 × 3 game (A,B)
with
A =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , B =

0 2 4
3 2 0
0 2 0
 . (2.2)
Figure 2.1 shows the mixed strategy simplices X and Y : the exterior facets
are labeled with the pure strategy that is played at the opposite vertex of the
simplex. The interior is covered by the best response regions, labeled by the
other player’s pure best response strategies. For example, the best-response
region in Y with label 1 is the set of all the (y1, y2, y3) ∈ R3 such that y1 ≥ y2
and y1 ≥ y3. There is only one pair (x, y) that is completely labeled, namely
x = (13 ,
2
3 , 0) with labels 3, 4, 5, and y = (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0) with labels 1, 2, 6. This is the
only Nash equilibrium of the game.
6 4
5
2 1
3(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
x
3
1 2
6
4
5
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
y
Figure 2.1 The labeled best response regions of the mixed strategy simplices of
player 1 (left) and player 2 (right) in game (2.2).
The representation of a game and its Nash equilibria in terms of best
response regions can be translated to an equivalent construction on polytopes.
The first step is to notice that the best-response regions can be obtained as
projections on X and Y of the best-response facets of the polyhedra
P = {(x, v) ∈ X × R | B>x ≤ 1v},
Q = {(y, u) ∈ Y × R | Ay ≤ 1u}.
(2.3)
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In P , these facets are the points (x, v) ∈ X × R such that (B>x)j = v, which
in turn correspond to the strategies x ∈ X of player 1 that give exactly payoff
v to player 2 when he plays strategy j; this payoff is the best-response payoff
by the definition of P . The projection of the facet defined by (B>x)j = v to X
then has label j. Analogously, the facet of Q given by the points (y, u) ∈ Y ×R
such that (Ay)i = u projects to the best-response region of Y with label i.
Example 2.2. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) In Example 2.1, the inequalities
B>x ≤ 1v are
3x2 ≤ v
2x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 ≤ v
4x1 ≤ v.
Figure 2.2 shows the best-response facets of P and their projection to X by
ignoring the payoff variable v, which gives the subdivision ofX into best-response
regions of Figure 2.1.
(0,0,1)
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
v
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Figure 2.2 The best response polyhedron of player 1 in game (2.2).
Given the assumptions on non-negativity of A and B>, we can change
coordinates to xi/v and yj/u and replace P and Q with the best-response
polytopes
P = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, B>x ≤ 1},
Q = { y ∈ Rn | Ay ≤ 1, y ≥ 0}.
(2.4)
In (2.4), both P and Q are defined by m+ n inequalities that correspond, in
the listed order, to the pure strategies of the two players with labels in [m+n].
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The polytope P is the intersection of the m + n half-spaces that correspond
to either player 1 not playing her i-th pure strategy or to a best response j
of player 2, where i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n]. The analogous statement holds for Q.
Formally, a point x ∈ P has label k if and only if either xk = 0 for k ∈ [m] or
(B>x)j = 1 for k = m + j with j ∈ [n], and a point in Q has label k if and
only if either (Ay)k = 1 for k ∈ [m] or yj = 0 for k = m+ j with j ∈ [n].
Hence, a point (x, y) ∈ P ×Q is completely labeled if and only if it satisfies
the complementarity condition that states that for all i ∈ [m] and all j ∈ [n],
xi = 0 or (Ay)i = 1 ,
yj = 0 or (B
>x)j = 1 .
(2.5)
Therefore, if (x, y) ∈ P × Q is completely labeled either the corresponding
point in P ×Q is a Nash equilibrium or (x, y) = (0,0); we refer to the latter
case as artificial equilibrium.
Example 2.3. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) Keeping on with Example 2.1 and
2.2, the best response polyhedron P of Figure 2.2 becomes the best response
polytope of Figure 2.3. Notice that the vertex (x, y) = (0,0) is completely
labeled, since it is labeled by the labels 1, 2, 3 in P and 4, 5, 6 in Q.
(0,0,0)
1x 2x
3x
5
6
4
Figure 2.3 The best response polytope of player 1 in game (2.2).
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We now consider some special cases of games and how they are related to
each other in terms of computational complexity. First of all, we note that any
bimatrix game can be “symmetrized”. This result is due to Gale, Kuhn and
Tucker [12] for zero-sum games, while its extension to non-zero-sum games is
a folklore result.
Proposition 2.1. Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game and let (x, y) be one of its
Nash equilibria. Then (z, z), where z = (xα, yβ) for suitable positive scalars
α and β, is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric game (C,C>), where
C =
 0 A
B> 0
 . (2.6)
McLennan and Tourky [17] have proven a result in the opposite direction
of Proposition 2.1: any symmetric game can be translated into a imitiation
game, where the payoff matrix of player 1 is the identity matrix I. In any Nash
equilibrium of (I,B), the mixed strategy x of player 1 corresponds exactly
to the symmetric equilibrium (x, x) in the symmetric game defined by the
payoff matrix of player 2. Since it takes polynomial time in the size of a
matrix to calculate its transpose, an algorithm that finds a Nash equilibrium
of a bimatrix game can be used to find a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a
symmetric game.
Theorem 3. (McLennan and Tourky [17]) The pair (x, x) is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the symmetric bimatrix game (C,C>) if and only if there
is some y such that (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of the imitation game (I,B)
with B = C>.
Notice that Theorem 3 applies to the symmetric equilibria of the symmetric
game but not to all its Nash equilibria; there could be non-symmetric equilibria
of (C,C>) that are not found through the imitation game, as shown in the
following example.
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Example 2.4. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) As an example, consider the
symmetric game (C,C>) with
C =

0 3 0
2 2 2
4 0 0
 , C> =

0 2 4
3 2 0
0 2 0
 . (2.7)
The corresponding imitation game is (I, C>) = (A,B), seen in Example
2.1. Figure 2.4 shows the labeled mixed-strategy simplices X and Y for the
game (2.7); since the game is symmetric, only the labels are different. In
addition to the symmetric equilibrium (x, x) where x = (13 ,
2
3 , 0), the game
has two non-symmetric equilibria in (a, b) and (b, a) with a = (12 ,
1
2 , 0) and
b = (0, 23 ,
1
3). The imitation game (A,B), on the other hand, has only one
equilibrium (x, y), corresponding to (x, x), with y = (12 ,
1
2 , 0).
6 4
5
2 1
3(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
x
3
6
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5 4
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
x
b
a
Figure 2.4 The best response regions of the symmetric game (2.7).
The characterization of Nash equilibria as completely labeled pairs (x, y)
holds for arbitrary bimatrix games. From now on, we impose a further condition:
all points in P have at most m labels, and all points in Q have at most n
labels. These games are called nondegenerate. This condition is required for
the Lemke-Howson algorithm (see section 3.2). The algorithm can also be
applied to degenerate games by lexicographic perturbation, as shown in von
Stengel [30]. In an equilibrium (x, y) of a nondegenerate game each label
appears exactly once. This also means that the number of pure best response
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strategies against a mixed strategy is never larger than the size of the support
of that mixed strategy. Geometrically, this means that no point of the best
response polytope P lies on more than m facets and no point of the best
response polytope Q lies on more than n facets, so both P and Q are simple.
Furthermore, a point of P has exactly m labels if and only if it is a vertex,
and a point of Q has exactly n labels if and only if it is a vertex. Therefore,
all completely labeled points (x, y) are vertices of the best response polytopes,
and Nash equilibria are isolated points.
Example 2.5. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) An example of degenerate game
is given by (C,C>) with
C =

0 4 0
2 2 2
4 0 0
 , C> =

0 2 4
4 2 0
0 2 0
 . (2.8)
As shown in Figure 2.5, the mixed strategy x = (12 ,
1
2 , 0), that also defines
the unique symmetric equilibrium (x, x) of the game, has three pure best
responses. The Nash equilibria (x, y) of the imitation game (I, C>) are not
unique, since any convex combination of (12 ,
1
2 , 0) and (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) can be chosen
for y.
1
3
3
12
2
(0,0,1)
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)x
3
1 2
4
5
6(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
y
Figure 2.5 Left: The best-response regions of the degenerate symmetric game (2.8).
Right: The best-response regions for player 2 in the corresponding
imitation game (I, C>).
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A generalization of imitation games is the class of unit vector games,
introduced by Balthasar [1]. These are defined as bimatrix games of the form
(U,B) where the columns of the matrix U are unit vectors. By the results
above, finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is at least as hard as
finding a Nash equilibrium of a unit vector game. Savani and von Stengel
[26] have shown that the problem of finding a completely labeled vertex of the
product of the best response polytopes P ×Q can be simplified for unit vector
games: it is enough to find a completely labeled vertex of a single polytope
P l, for which the last n facets are labeled following a the labeling in [m] that
also encodes the matrix U .
Theorem 4. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) Let l : [n] → [m] be a function,
and let (U,B) be the unit vector game with U = (el(1) · · · el(n)).
Let Ni = {j ∈ [n] | l(j) = i} for i ∈ [m], and define P l and Ql as
P l = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, B>x ≤ 1},
Ql = {y ∈ Rn | y ≥ 0, ∑j∈Ni yj ≤ 1 for i ∈ [m]}. (2.9)
Let lf be the labeling of the facets of P
l with labels in [m] defined as follows:
xi ≥ 0 has label i for i ∈ [m],
(B>x)j ≤ 1 has label l(j) for j ∈ [n].
(2.10)
Then x ∈ P l is a completely labeled vertex of P l \ {0} (that is, has all labels
in [m]) if and only if there is some y ∈ Ql such that, after scaling, the pair
(x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (U,B).
Proof. Let P and Q be the best response polytopes of (U,B) as in (2.4), and
let (x, y) ∈ P × Q \ {(0,0)} be a Nash equilibrium of (U,B). Then (x, y) is
completely labeled with labels in [m + n]. If xi = 0, then x has label i ∈ m.
If xi > 0, then y has label i, so (Uy)i = 1. Therefore for some j ∈ [n] we have
yj > 0 and Uj = ei; that is, we have yj > 0 and l(j) = i for some j ∈ [n].
Since yj > 0, x ∈ P has label m + j; then, (B>x)j = 1; therefore x ∈ P l has
label l(j) = i. Hence, x is a completely labeled vertex of P l.
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Conversely, let x ∈ P l \ {0} be completely labeled. If xi > 0, then there is
j ∈ [n] such that (B>x) = j and l(j) = i; that is, j ∈ Ni. For all i ∈ [m] such
that xi > 0, define y as follows: yj = 1, and yh = 0 for all h ∈ Ni \ {j}. Then
(x, y) ∈ P ×Q is completely labeled.
Example 2.6. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) The game in Example 2.1 is a
unit vector game with l(i) = i. In the polytope P l of Figure 2.6 the labels
4, 5 and 6 of the best response polytope P of Figure 2.3 are replaced by 1,
2 and 3, since the corresponding columns of A are the unit vectors e1, e2, e3.
The only completely labeled point of P l are the origin 0, corresponding to the
“artificial” equilibrium, and x, corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium
of the unit vector game (2.2).
x
0
2
3 11
3
2
Figure 2.6 The polytope P l of the unit vector game (2.2).
We now move on the dual version of Theorem 4 given by Balthasar [1].
We can translate the polytope P l of (2.9) to P = {x − 1 | x ∈ P l}, possibly
multiplying all payoffs in B by a constant so that 0 is in the interior of P ,
which holds if 1 in the interior of P l, that is, all columns bj of the matrix B
fulfill 1>bj < 1, for j ∈ [n]. Then
P = {x+ 1 ≥ 0, (x+ 1)>B ≤ 1} =
= {x ∈ Rm | − xi ≤ 1 for i ∈ [m], x>(bj/(1− 1>bj)) ≤ 1 for j ∈ [n]}.
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The polar of P is then
P∆ = conv({−ei | i ∈ [m]} ∪ {cj | j ∈ [n]}) (2.11)
where cj = bj/(1−1>bj). Since P and P∆ have 0 in their interior, P∆∆ = P .
Furthermore, P∆ is simplicial and its facets correspond to the vertices of P
and vice versa. We label the vertices of P∆ as the corresponding facets in P l,
so the completely labeled facets of P∆ correspond to the completely labeled
vertices of P l. In particular, the facet corresponding to 0 is
F0 = {x ∈ P∆ | −1>x = 1}
= conv{−ei | i ∈ [m]}.
(2.12)
Theorem 4 then translates to the following.
Theorem 5. (Balthasar [1]) Let P∆ be a labeled m-dimensional simplicial
polytope with 0 in its interior and vertices e1, . . . , em, c1, . . . , cn such that F0
in (2.12) is a facet of P∆.
Let (U,B) be a unit vector game, with U = (el(1) · · · el(n)) for a labeling
l : [n]→ [m] and B = [ b1 · · · bn ], where bj = cj/(1 + 1>cj) for j ∈ [n].
Let lv be the labeling of the vertices of P
∆ given by
lv(−ei) = i for i ∈ [m],
lv(cj) = l(j) for j ∈ [n].
(2.13)
Then a facet F 6= F0 of P∆ with normal vector v is completely labeled if and
only if (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (U,B), where x = (v + 1)/(1>(v + 1)),
so that xi = 0 if and only if ei ∈ F for i ∈ [m] and the mixed strategy y is
the uniform distribution on the set of the pure best replies to x, which in turn
correspond to all j ∈ [n] such that cj is a vertex of F .
Theorem 4 gives a correspondence between completely labeled vertices of
P l and equilibria of the unit vector game (U,B) with the “artificial” equilibrium
corresponding to the vertex 0. Theorem 5 gives a correspondence between
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completely labeled facets of P∆ and equilibria of (U,B) with the “artificial”
equilibrium corresponding to the facet F0 in (2.12).
Given a bimatrix game (A,B), it takes polynomial time to write and solve
the linear equations defining its best response polyhedra P ,Q and its best
response polytopes P,Q. It also takes polynomial time to label P ,Q and
P,Q. Analogously, given a unit vector game (U,B), it takes polynomial time
to construct and label the polytope P l and its polar. Therefore, Theorem 4
gives a polynomial time reduction from the problem 2-Nash to the problem
Another Completely Labeled Vertex of Table 2.1 and Theorem 5 gives
a dual reduction to the problem Another Completely Labeled Facet of
Table 2.2.
Another Completely Labeled Vertex
input : An m-dimensional simple polytope P with m+n facets; a labeling
lf : [m+n]→ [n]; a vertex v0 of P that is completely labeled by lf .
output: A vertex v 6= v0 of P that is completely labeled by lf .
Table 2.1 The problem Another Completely Labeled Vertex.
Another Completely Labeled Facet
input : A simplicial m-dimensional polytope P∆ with m + n vertices; a
labeling lv : [m + n] → [n]; a facet F0 of P∆ that is completely
labeled by lv.
output: A facet F 6= F0 of P∆ that is completely labeled by lv.
Table 2.2 The problem Another Completely Labeled Facet.
Proposition 2.2. 2-Nash reduces in polynomial time to Another Completely
Labeled Vertex and Another Completely Labeled Facet.
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2.2 Cyclic Polytopes and Gale Strings
We now apply the results of the previous section to unit vector games for which
the best response polytope is the dual of a cyclic polytope. These polytopes
are characterized by their representation as a combinatorial structure, called
Gale strings. We will first define cyclic polytopes, then Gale string, then
we will give the theorem by Gale [11] that shows the equivalence of the two
representations.
The moment curve in dimension d is defined as
µd : R −→ Rd µd : t 7−→ (t, t2, . . . , td)>. (2.14)
The cyclic polytope Cd(n) in dimension d with n vertices, where n > d, is
given as the convex hull of any n points on the moment curve, that is, by n
arbitrary reals t1, . . . , tn, where t1 < · · · < tn, according to
Cd(n) = conv{µd(ti) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} . (2.15)
Example 2.7. Figure 2.7 shows the cyclic polytope in dimension 3 with 6 facets.
Figure 2.7 The cyclic polytope C3(6).
Given k ∈ N and a set S, we can represent the function f : [k] → S as
the string s = s(1)s(2) · · · s(k); we have a bitstring if S = {0, 1}. A maximal
substring of consecutive 1’s in a bitstring is called a run. A run is called even
if its length is even, and odd if its length is odd. We will use the notation
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1k for a run of length k and 0k for a string of 0’s of length k. A Gale string
of length n and dimension d, where n > d, is a bitstring s that satisfies the
following conditions:
1. exactly d bits of s are equal to 1;
2. (Gale Evenness Condition) 01k0 is a substring of s ⇒ k is even.
We denote by G(d, n) be the set of Gale strings of length n and dimension d.
In general, the Gale Evenness Condition allows for Gale strings that start
or end with an odd-length run; if d is even then s can start with an odd run if
and only if it ends with an odd run. When d is even, we can therefore see the
Gale strings in G(d, n) as “loops” obtained by “gluing together” the endpoints
of the strings; on these “loops” all runs are even. Formally, we can see the
bit positions in a Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) with d even as equivalence classes
modulo n.
Example 2.8. As an example for even d, we have
G(4, 6) = {111100,111001,110011,100111, 001111,
011110,110110,101101, 011011}
The strings 111100, 111001, 110011, 100111, 001111 and 011110 are equivalent
under a cyclic shift (if considering the strings as “loops”, the 1’s are all
consecutive), as are the strings 110110, 101101 and 011011 (two runs of
two 1’s separated by a single 0). As an example for odd d, we have
G(3, 5) = {11100,10110,10011,11001, 01101, 00111} .
Notice that because d is odd, a cyclic shift is not allowed: 01011 is a shift of
10110 but it is not a Gale string.
The relation between cyclic polytopes and Gale strings was given by Gale [11].
Theorem 6. (Gale [11]) For any d, n ∈ N, where n > d, a set F is a facet of
Cd(n) if and only if
F = conv{µ(tj) | s(j) = 1 for s ∈ G(d, n)}. (2.16)
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Proof. First, a hyperplane in Rd of the form {x ∈ Rd | a>x = a0} for
some nonzero vector a = (a1, . . . , ad)
> can contain at most d points on the
moment curve, because otherwise the polynomial equation with a polynomial
of degree d given by −a0 + a1t + a2t2 + · · · adtd = 0 would have more than d
roots t. For the same reason, any d points on the moment curve are affinely
independent and define a unique hyperplane through them, which the moment
curve crosses at these points. Notice that if the curve were tangent to the
hyperplane at an intersection, then a slight perturbation of the hyperplane
could contain d+ 1 or d− 1 points on the moment curve.
Let t1 < · · · < td be a choice of d of the tj ’s in the definition (2.15) of Cd(n);
then the intersection of the moment curve and of the hyperplane H through
the points µd(t1), . . . , µd(td) coincides exactly with the points µd(ti). Since
the moment curve crosses the hyperplane at all intersections, if t, t′ /∈ {ti} and
t < ti < t
′ for exactly one of the ti’s then µd(t) and µd(t′) are on opposite
sides of H.
A facet F of the cyclic polytope Cd(n) is given by F = H ∩ Cd(n). This
corresponds to a choice of ti’s such that for all the other tk /∈ {ti | i ∈ [d]} in
the definition of Cd(n), the corresponding µd(tk) are on the same side of H.
This can happen only if for every pair of these tk’s the moment curve has an
even number of crossings at µ(ti) of H between them. This is equivalent to
ask that there is an even number of ti’s between any two tk’s.
Let s be the bitstring in which the 1’s correspond to the ti’s and the 0’s
correspond to the other tk’s. Then the condition that the set F in (2.16) is a
facet is equivalent to the Gale Evenness Condition.
Because the moment curve has at most d points on any hyperplane, each
facet of Cd(n) is a d-simplex, so Cd(n) is simplicial and the choice of the tj ’s
in (2.15) is irrelevant for the characterization of the facets of Cd(n) as Gale
strings, as long as t1 < · · · < tn.
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Example 2.9. Consider the facet F of the cyclic polytope C3(6) marked in blue
in Figure 2.8. Let us label the vertices on the moment curve as ti, with i ∈ [n],
and we set s(i) = 1 if ti is a vertex of F and s(i) = 0 otherwise. Figure 2.9
represents the intersection of the moment curve and the hyperplane H in R3
defined by the ti such that s(i) = 1. This shows how the corresponding Gale
string s ∈ G(3, 6) is s = 100110.
Figure 2.8 The facet of the cyclic polytope C3(6) through the points
µ3(t1), µ3(t4), µ3(t5).
H
1 1 10 0 0
Figure 2.9 The facet of the cyclic polytope C3(6) through the points
µ3(t1), µ3(t4), µ3(t5), as in Figure 2.8, seen from the side of the
hyperplane. This corresponds to the Gale string s = 100110 ∈ G(3, 6).
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Example 2.10. Figure 2.10 shows the cyclic polytope C4(6), with the exterior
facet corresponding to the Gale string s = 111100. Figure 2.11 shows the
correspondence between the string s = 111100 and the intersection of the
moment curve and the hyperplane H.
5
6
1
3
2
4
Figure 2.10 The cyclic polytope C4(6). The thin lines represent the edges inside
the exterior facet, in bold lines. Vertex i corresponds to ti.
H
0 01111
Figure 2.11 The facet of the cyclic polytope C4(6) given by the intersection
of the moment curve and the hyperplane H through the points
µ4(t1), µ4(t2), µ4(t3), µ4(t4). This corresponds to the Gale string
s = 111100 ∈ G(4, 6).
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Example 2.11. As a counterexample, consider Figure 2.12. The points t = t3
and t′ = t5 lie on the moment curve, but µ4(t3) and µ4(t5) are on opposite
sides of the hyperplane H defined by the other four points. The corresponding
bitstring is s = 110101, which is not a Gale string. The violation of the Gale
Evenness Condition corresponds to the change of side with respect to the
hyperplane between t and t′.
H
1111 0 0
Figure 2.12 There is a change of side between two µ4(tj)’s (for the 0 bits). The
bitstring s = 1101011 does not satisfy the Gale Evenness Condition,
and the set of µ4(ti)’s (for the 1 bits) does not define a facet of C4(6).
2.3 Gale Games
We now apply Theorem 6 to the study of bimatrix games. By Proposition
2.2, solving 2-Nash can be reduced to Another Completely Labeled
Facet; if the polytope P∆ in Theorem 5 is cyclic, we can exploit Theorem 6
to translate this special case of 2-Nash to a problem on Gale strings.
First of all, we have to define a labeling on Gale strings such that a
completely labeled Gale string corresponds to a completely labeled facet of P∆.
We say that s ∈ G(d, n) is a completely labeled Gale string for some labeling
function ls : [n] → [d] if {ls(i) | s(i) = 1 for i ∈ [n]} = [d]. Since a string
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in G(d, n) has exacty d bits equal to 1, a Gale string is completely labeled if
and only if for each j ∈ [d] there is exactly one i ∈ [n] such that s(i) = 1 and
ls(i) = j.
Notice that, given a labeling ls : [n] → [d], it may not always be possible
to find a Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) that is completely labeled by ls.
Example 2.12. For ls = 121314, there are no completely labeled Gale strings.
The labels ls(i) = 2, 3, 4 appear only once in ls, so we must have s(2) =
s(4) = s(6) = 1. We also must have ls(i) = 1 for exactly one i = 1, 3, 5. The
candidate strings are then s1 = 110101, s2 = 011101, s3 = 010111, but none
of these satisfies the Gale Evenness Condition.
A Gale game is a unit vector game (U,B) where U = [el(1) · · · el(d)] for some
labeling l : [n] → [d] and for which the dual of the best response polytope is
a cyclic polytope P∆ = conv{e1, . . . , ed, c1, . . . , cn}. We define the problem
Gale Nash as in Table 2.3
Gale Nash
input : A Gale game.
output: A Nash equilibrium of the game.
Table 2.3 The problem Gale Nash.
Theorem 5 gives the labeling (2.13) for the d+ n vertices of P∆ as
lv(−ei) = i for i ∈ [d],
lv(cj) = l(j) for j ∈ [n].
We define the labeling ls : [d+ n]→ [d] of G(d, n) as
ls(i) = i for i ∈ [d],
ls(d+ j) = l(j) for j ∈ [n].
(2.17)
Then the Gale strings s ∈ G(d, d + n) that are completely labeled by ls
correspond exactly to facets of P∆ that are completely labeled by lv, with
the facet F0 corresponding to the “trivial” completely labeled string 1
d0n.
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Example 2.13. Given the string of labels ls = 123432, there are four associated
completely labeled Gale strings in G(4, 6): sA = 111100, sB = 110110,
sC = 100111 and sD = 101101. These correspond to the completely labeled
facets for the labeling shown in Figure 2.13 on the left.
A
B
2
C
1
3
4
3
2D
facet 1 2 3 4 3 2
A 1 1 1 1 0 0
B 1 1 0 1 1 0
C 1 0 0 1 1 1
D 1 0 1 1 0 1
Figure 2.13 The cyclic polytope C4(6), where the labeling of the vertices
corresponds to the labeling of G(4, 6) given by ls = 123432.
The completely labeled facets A, B, C and D correspond respectively
to the completely Gale strings sA = 111100, sB = 110110, sC =
100111 and sD = 101101.
From this point forward, we will assume that the labeling ls : [d+n]→ [d]
satisfies ls(i) 6= ls(i+1). This can be done without loss of generality, given the
following consideration. Suppose that ls(i) = ls(i+1) for some index i, and let
s be a completely labeled Gale string for ls. Then only one of s(i) and s(i+ 1)
can be equal to 1 (it is possible that both are equal to 0), so s(i)s(i+ 1) will
never be part of a run of even length that “interferes” with the Gale Evenness
Condition. Therefore, we can identify the indices i and i+ 1.
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We can now define the problem Another Gale as in Table 2.4. For
brevity, we change the notation from d+ n to n.
Another Gale
input : A labeling l : [n] → [d], where d < n. A Gale string s ∈ G(d, n),
completely labeled by l.
output: A Gale string s0 ∈ G(d, n), completely labeled by l, such that
s0 6= s.
Table 2.4 The problem Another Gale.
It takes polynomial time to translate the facets of the cyclic polytope
Cd(d + n) into the corresponding Gale strings in G(d, d + n), following the
proof of Theorem 6. Defining the labeling ls from the labeling lv also takes
polynomial time: for the labels i ∈ [d] it is immediate, for the labels d+j, where
j ∈ [n], we have to check the d×n matrix U of the imitation game. Therefore,
by Proposition 2.2, we have a reduction from Gale Nash to Another Gale.
Proposition 2.3. The problem Gale Nash of Table 2.3 is polynomial-time
reducible to the problem Another Gale of Table 2.4.
Proposition 2.3 can be improved: it is enough to consider the case where
d is even.
Proposition 2.4. The problem Another Gale of Table 2.4 is reducible to
the case where d is even.
Proof. Consider an instance of the problem Another Gale with d odd.
Let s′0 ∈ G(d+ 1, n+ 1) be the string defined as
s′0(i) = s0(i) for i ∈ [n],
s′0(n+ 1) = 1.
This is indeed a Gale string. It is trivial to see that there are exactly d+1 bits
equal to 1; furthermore, since s0 is a Gale string, the Gale Evenness Condition
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holds in all the interior runs of s′0. Let now l′ : [n+1]→ [d+1] be the labeling
defined as
l′(i) = l(i) for i ∈ [n],
l′(n+ 1) = d+ 1.
(2.18)
Notice that s′0 is completely labeled by l′, since for every for each j ∈ [d] there
is exactly one i ∈ [n] such that s′0(i) = s0(i) = 1 and ls(i) = j, and the only
occurrence of the label d+ 1 is at index n+ 1, where s′0(n+ 1) = 1.
Let s′ be any bitstring of length n+ 1 such that s′(n+ 1) = 1, and let s be
the bitstring of length n such that s(i) = s′(i) for i ∈ [n]. First of all, notice
that if s′ ∈ G(d + 1, n + 1) then s ∈ G(d, n): it is obtained by removing a
bit that is equal to 1, and the Gale Evenness Condition still holds in all the
interior runs. Furthermore, if s′ is completely labeled for l′, then s′(n+1) = 1,
since the only occurrence of label d+ 1 is at index n+ 1 and for all the other
labels j ∈ [d] there is exactly one i ∈ [n] such that s(i) = 1 and ls(i) = j.
Therefore, a solution for the original instance of Another Gale can be
found by solving the problem Another Gale with input s′0 and l′ and output
s′, then considering the corresponding completely labeled Gale string s ∈
G(d, n) defined as above.
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Chapter 3
Algorithmic and Complexity
Results
In the previous chapter we have defined some problems of the form “find
another completely labeled” vertex, facet or Gale string; in this chapter we
finally study the complexity of these problems. A solution of Another
Completely Labeled Vertex is given by the classic algorithm first
introduced by Lemke and Howson [16]. In turn, the Lemke-Howson algorithm
prompted the definition of the classes PPAD and PPA by Papadimitriou [24];
the definition of these classes is given in the first section of this chapter.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm can be used to prove that the “another
completely labeled” problems are in the complexity class PPAD. It is
interesting to notice that all this proof can be seen as ultimately relying on
Shapley’s [27] work discussed in the previous chapter, see Savani and von
Stengel [25], Merschen [19], and Ve´gh and von Stengel [28]. In the second
section we relate the different versions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and
the consequent proof that the “another completely labeled” problems are in
the class PPA. We first use it to solve Another Completely Labeled
Vertex, and therefore 2-Nash, its original motivation. The version for
Another Completely Labeled Vertex follows immediately by a duality
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argument. Finally, we focus on Another Gale and give the full proof that
it belongs to the PPAD complexity class, following the clear exposition in
Merschen [19]. We close the section with an example of a labeling, due to
Morris [20], for which the Lemke-Howson-Gale Algorithm has exponential
running time. This is the labeling that Savani and von Stengel [25] have
used to construct “hard to solve” games.
The third and last section presents our original result: a polynomial time
algorithm for Another Gale, that is, a proof that Gale Nash is in FP.
Unless PPAD = P, this goes in the opposite direction of our first conjecture
of PPAD-completeness suggested by the “hard to solve” games by Savani
and von Stengel [25]. Our proof relies on a theorem by Edmonds [7] that gives
a polynomial-time algorithm to find a perfect matching of a graph or decide
that it is not possible to find one. The key of the proof is the construction of
a graph from any string of labels such that the perfect matchings of the graph
correspond to the completely labeled Gale strings for the labels. We first prove
the FP complexity of finding one of these completely labeled Gale strings, then
we extend the proof to find the second string required by Another Gale.
3.1 Polynomial Parity Argument
As mentioned in section 1.3, Megiddo and Papadimitriou [18] have proved that,
unless NP = co−NP, the class TFNP (total function non-deterministic
polynomial-time) does not have complete problems. To circumvent this
limitation, Papadimitriou [24] focused on the argument that proves that a
problem in TFNP has indeed a solution. To study this he introduced, among
others, the classes PPA (Polynomial Parity Argument) and PPAD
(Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version).
The existence of a solution for a problem in PPA can be proved using the
argument “in any undirected graph with one odd-degree node there must be
another odd-degree node.” Similarly, problems in PPAD are guaranteed to
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have a solution by a proof employing the argument “in any directed graph in
which all vertices have indegree and outdegree at most one and there is a source
(a node with indegree zero) there must be a sink (a node with outdegree zero).”
Formally: a polynomial-sized circuit with n input bits and m output bits is a
function C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that can be represented with polynomially
many standard “logic gates”. We define PPAD as the class of problems
reducible to the problem End Of The Line, see Table 3.1. This is the
definition given in Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6]; the original
definition in Papadimitriou [24] is given in terms of polynomial-time Turing
machines instead of polynomial-sized circuits.
End Of The Line
input : Two polynomial-sized circuits S and P with n input bits and n
output bits such that P (0n) = 0n 6= S(0n).
output: An input x ∈ {0, 1}n such that P (S(x)) 6= x or S(P (x)) 6= x 6= 0n
Table 3.1 The problem End Of The Line.
The problems in PPAD can be seen as a circuit S (“successor”), and a
circuit P (“predecessor”) that are used to construct a directed graph with
an edge (x, y) if and only if S(x) = y and P (y) = x. Furthermore, the
graph is guaranteed to have a standard source 0n, which is also given in the
input; this guarantees the existence of the output, which is either a sink or a
non-standard source. Figure 3.1 presents an example of a graph implicit in a
PPAD problem.
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cycle
isolated 
point
path
sink
standard 
source
source
S(x)
P(x) x = P(S(x))
x = S(P(x))
Figure 3.1 A PPAD problem as a directed graph with maximal indegree and
outdegree 1.
The input is given by the circuits S (in green) and P (in red) and the
standard source (the yellow node). These circuits are used to define
paths (in black), cycles (in blue) and isolated points (in purple).
The output can be either a sink (a red node) or a nonstandard source
(a green node).
A graph for a PPA problem is analogous to Figure 3.1, but it is
undirected and instead of sources and sinks there are generic endpoints.
Another class relying on proofs by parity argument is PPADS, defined by
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6]; its definition is analogous to
PPAD, but the output of the problem is required to be a sink of the End Of
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The Line graph. We have that PPADS ⊆ PPAD ⊆ PPA; it is an open
problem whether the inclusion is strict.
As we have already noticed, the problem n-Nash, see Table 1.3, is a
total function problem. Papadimitriou [24] proved that it belongs to TFNP.
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6] and Chen and Deng [5] have later
proven its PPAD-completeness, the former for n ≥ 3 and the latter for n ≥ 2.
A small amendment of the proof in [6] can be found in Casetti [3].
Theorem 7. (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6]; Chen and
Deng [5]) For n ≥ 2, the problem n-Nash is PPAD-complete.
3.2 The Lemke-Howson Algorithm
Theorem 7 suggests that the study of solutions of n-Nash as endpoints of
paths can yield interesting results about the complexity of the problem itself.
In this section we will study an algorithm that describes exactly this idea.
Let P be a simple d-polytope with n facets. We pivot on the vertices
of P by moving from a vertex x to another vertex y connected to x by an
edge, see Figure 3.2. Note that, since P is simple, there are exactly d possible
choices for y. Analogously, we pivot on the facets of a simplicial polytope P∆
in dimension d by moving from a facet F to a facet G that shares all vertices
but one with F , see Figure 3.3. As above, since P∆ is simplicial, there are d
possible choices for G.
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pivot
F’
F
F1 F2
x
y
x2
x1
Figure 3.2 A pivot from vertex x to vertex y on the edge of a cube.
G
pivot
F
v2v1
x
x’
F2F1
Figure 3.3 A pivot from facet F of an octahedron to facet G.
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Suppose now that there is a labeling lf : [n]→ [d] of the facets of the simple
polytope P . If we pivot from vertex x to vertex x′ we “leave behind” a facet F
with label k to which x belongs, but x′ does not. At the same time, we “reach”
a facet F ′ with label h, to which x does not belong, but x′ does. Therefore, if x
has labels (l1, . . . , k, . . . , ld), then x
′ has labels (l1, . . . , h, . . . , ld). We call this
dropping label k and picking up label h, or pivoting on label k; see Figure 3.4.
Analogously, if there is a labeling lv : [n]→ [d] of the vertices of the simplicial
poytope P∆ and we pivot from a facet F with labels (l1, . . . , k, . . . , ld) to a
facet F ′ with labels (l1, . . . , h, . . . , ld), we say that we drop label k and pick up
label h, or that we pivot on label k; see Figure 3.5.
k
h
(l1 ,l2, h)
l2l1
(l1 ,l2, k)
Figure 3.4 A pivot on label k: drop vertex x with labels (l1, l2, k) and pick up
vertex x′ with labels (l1, l2, h).
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l2l1
k
h
(l1,l2,h)
(l1,l2,k)
Figure 3.5 A pivot on label k: drop a facet with labels (l1, l2, k) and pick up a
facet with labels (l1, l2, h).
Consider a labeling function l : [n]→ [d], and a subset S of [n] with |S| = d.
Then S is called almost completely labeled if
l(S) = { l(s) | s ∈ S} = [d] \ {k} (3.1)
that is, all labels appear once in S except for one missing label k ∈ [d]. Since
|S| = d, in that case there is one duplicate label h ∈ [d] that appears twice
in S.
Let S be the set of labels of a vertex in a simple polytope, or the set of labels
of a facet in a simplicial polytope. We call this vertex (or, respectively, facet)
almost completely labeled vertex (or facet) if it is almost completely labeled by
S with respect to the labeling of the facets (or, respectively, vertices) of the
polytope. It is easy to see that if we pivot from an almost completely labeled
vertex (or facet) on the duplicate label, or from a completely labeled vertex
(or facet) on any label, this becomes the missing label k, and we reach either
an almost completely labeled or a completely labeled vertex (or facet).
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The algorithm by Lemke and Howson [16] finds one Nash equilibrium of a
bimatrix game. In a modern description (e.g., Savani and von Stengel [25]),
it employs pivoting on the vertices of a simple polytope, moving through a
succession of almost completely labeled vertices with missing label k, where
this polytope is the product P × Q of the best-response polytopes. This
can be abstracted slightly further by considering only a single polytope P
in dimension d with facets labels from [d]. Algorithm 1 gives this latter
version; for simplicity of notation, we will call it Lemke-Howson Algorithm.
Algorithm 1 also computes a “Lemke path”, in the terminology of Morris [20];
this, in turn, can be used to prove some fundamental properties of both the
Lemke-Howson Algorithm and the Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game.
Algorithm 1: Lemke-Howson
input : A simple d-polytope P with n facets and a labeling
lf : [n]→ [d] of the facets of P . A vertex x0 of P that is
completely labeled by lf .
output: A vertex x 6= x0 of P that is completely labeled by lf .
1 choose any label k ∈ [d] as missing label
2 pivot on label k from x0 to x reaching a new facet with label h
3 while h 6= k, so x is not completely labeled do
4 pivot away from the other facet with label h from x to x′
5 let h be the label of the new facet of x′
6 set x = x′
7 return x
Proposition 3.1. The Lemke-Howson Algorithm 1 returns a solution to the
PPA problem Another Completely Labeled Vertex. Furthermore, the
number of completely labeled vertices in a simple polytope with labeled facets
is even.
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Proof. We first show that the Lemke-Howson Algorithm works. From the
completely labeled vertex x0, there is a unique edge that leaves the facet with
label k which leads to a new vertex x, as in step 2 of the algorithm. If x
is completely labeled, then the algorithm terminates with output x, and it
is trivial to see that x 6= x0. Otherwise, x is an almost completely labeled
vertex with duplicate label h, where one of the facets that contain x and have
label h is a “new” facet that did not contain the preceding vertex on the Lemke
path. Since S is simple, x is always on exactly d facets and the duplicate label
is unique. Hence no vertex, including x0, can ever be re-visited on the path
because it would otherwise offer an alternative way to proceed when the vertex
was encountered for the first time.
The parity result is proven by the following argument: each Lemke path is
uniquely determined by its missing label and its starting point, so the Lemke
path from the endpoint with the same missing label will lead back to the
starting point. Since the endpoint and the starting point are different, the
Lemke paths must connect an even number of points.
Finally, for each label k ∈ [d] chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 1, the Lemke
paths are disjoint paths connecting all the completely labeled vertices of P ,
with a standard starting point x0. The problem Another Completely
Labeled Vertex corresponds to finding a non-standard endpoint of this
graph, which is a PPA problem.
Proposition 3.1 can be extended. Lemke paths can be used to prove that
Another Completely Labeled Vertex is in PPAD, not just in PPA.
This is done by giving a sign (positive or negative) to the vertices. It can
be proven that the endpoints of the Lemke paths have opposite sign, and the
paths can therefore be oriented accordingly. Shapley [27] proved an analogous
result: two Nash equilibria at the ends of a Lemke path have opposite index,
a concept analogous to sign but defined using determinants on the payoff
matrices for the equilibrium support. The index of a Nash equilibrium is
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usually normalized, by multiplication with −1 of all signs if necessary, so that
the artificial equilibrium has index −1; then a nondegenerate game with n
Nash equilibria with index +1 has n − 1 Nash equilibria with index −1. For
an in-depth study of the topics related to sign in the Lemke-Howson and other
algorithms, we refer to Ve´gh and von Stengel [28].
Applying the parity result of Proposition 3.1 to the case of a bimatrix game
(not necessarily a unit vector game), and remembering that the point (0,0)
corresponds to the “artificial” equilibrium, we have the following result, due
to Lemke and Howson [16].
Theorem 8. (Lemke-Howson [16]) Every non-degenerate bimatrix game has
an odd number of Nash equilibria.
There are two ways of using the Lemke-Howson Algorithm to find a Nash
equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B). The first one is to “symmetrize” the
game as in Proposition 2.1. Let R = {z ∈ Rm+n | z ≥ 0, Cz ≤ 1} be the
polytope associated to the game (C,C>), where
C =
(
0 A
B> 0
)
.
The facets of C correspond to 2(m+n) inequalities. We label both the i-th and
the (m+ n+ i)-th inequality as i ∈ [m+ n] and we apply the Lemke-Howson
algorithm starting from the vertex 0. This returns a Nash equilibrium (z, z)
of C, which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium (x, y) = z of (A,B). We can
also follow the “traditional” exposition of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm given
by Shapley [27]. In this version, we alternate a move on the best response
polytopes P and a move on the best response polytope Q of (2.4). Since the
polytopes P and Q are in Rm and Rn, whereas R is a polytope in Rm+n, the
second version is much easier to visualize.
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Example 3.1. (Savani and von Stengel [26]) Consider the 3× 3 game (A,B) of
Example 2.1.
A =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , B =

0 2 4
3 2 0
0 2 0
 .
The best response polytopes can be represented as the best response regions
of Figure 2.1 extended to the origin 0, as in Figure 3.6.
The path starts from (0,0). We choose the missing label 1 and move in
the polytope P . Then label 6 is duplicate; so we drop it and we make the
next move on the polytope Q, and so on until we reach the point x in P and
y in Q, which gives here the only Nash equilibrium (x, y) of (A,B).
0
5
4
62
1
3
x
0
3
21
4
6
y5
Figure 3.6 Lemke path for missing label 1 on the best response polytopes of player
1 (left) and player 2 (right) of game (2.2).
It is possible to have an equilibrium that cannot be reached applying
the Lemke-Howson Algorithm from the artificial equilibrium, or even from
the endpoint of a Lemke path from the artificial equilibrium. This can be
seen in the next example, where the Lemke paths form two disconnected
components. Notice that, by the parity result of Proposition 3.1, each one
of these components must contain an even number of equilibria (either Nash
or artificial), since all these equilibria are endpoints of Lemke paths.
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Example 3.2. (R. Wilson, cited in Shapley [27]) Consider the symmetric game
(C,C>) with
C =

0 3 0
2 2 0
3 0 1
 . (3.2)
There are three equilibria of (C,C>), all of them symmetric, at (xi, xi) with
x1 = (0, 0, 1), x2 = (1/6, 1/3, 1/2) and x3 = (1/3, 2/3, 0).
All Lemke paths from the artificial equilibrium (0, 0) end at (x1, x1), and
consequently all other Lemke paths connect (x2, x2) and (x3, x3); see Figure
3.7.
0
5
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1
3
x1
x2
x3
0
2
13
4
6
y1
y2
y35
Figure 3.7 The Lemke paths for missing label 1 (yellow), 2 (green) and 3 (pink)
on the best response polytopes of game (3.2).
The paths for missing label 4, 5 and 6 on the best response polytope of
player 1 are the same as the paths of 1, 2 and 3 on the best response
polytope of player 2, and vice versa.
The dual version of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm 1 and of Proposition
3.1 is straightforward; analogously, the proof can be extended to show that
Another Completely Labeled Facet is PPAD.
55
Algorithm 2: Dual Lemke-Howson
input : A simplicial m-polytope P∆ with n vertices and a labeling
lv : [n]→ [d] of the vertices of P∆. A facet F0 of P∆ that is
completely labeled by lv.
output: A facet F 6= F0 of P∆ that is completely labeled by lv.
1 choose any label k ∈ [d] as missing label
2 pivot on label k from F0 to F which has a new vertex with label h
3 while h 6= k, so F is not completely labeled do
4 pivot away from the other vertex with label h from F to F ′
5 let h be the label of the new vertex of F ′
6 set F = F ′
7 return F
Proposition 3.2. The Dual Lemke-Howson Algorithm 2 returns a solution to
the PPAD problem Another Completely Labeled Facet. Furthermore,
the number of completely labeled facets in a simplicial polytope with labeled
vertices is even.
By Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, in the case of unit vector games it is enough
to apply the Lemke-Howson Algorithm 1 to the polytope P l in (2.9), or the
Dual Lemke-Howson Algorithm 2 to the polytope P∆ in (2.11). The following
theorem by Savani and von Stengel [26] guarantees that not only does this
yield a Nash equilibrium, but no potential solutions are “lost” considering the
polytope P l with m labels instead of the product of polytopes P × Q with
m+ n labels; an analogous result holds for the dual case.
Theorem 9. Let (U,B) be a unit vector game, with U = [el(1) · · · el(n)] for a
labeling l : [n]→ [m]. Let
P = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, B>x ≤ 1},
Q = {y ∈ Rn | Ay ≤ 1, y ≥ 0},
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as in (2.4), and let
P l = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, B>x ≤ 1} with labels in [m] as in (2.10)
as in (2.9). Then for the missing label k ∈ [m] the Lemke path on P × Q
projects to a path on P that corresponds to the Lemke path on P l for the
missing label k. For the missing label k = m + j, where j ∈ [n], the Lemke
path on P ×Q projects to a path on Q that corresponds to the Lemke path on
P l for the missing label l(j).
We finally focus on the case of Gale games. In line with Proposition 2.3,
we look for solutions of the problem Another Gale, see Table 2.4. By
Proposition 2.4, it is enough to study the case of Gale strings s ∈ G(d, n) with
d even. We will consider these as “wrapped-around strings”.
Let s(i) = 1 for an index i ∈ [n]. Then, by the Gale evenness condition,
there is an odd run of 1’s either on the left or on the right of position i in s.
Let j be the first index after this run. A pivot from s to s′ is given by setting
s′(i) = 0 and s′(j) = 1 to yield the new string s′ which otherwise agrees with s.
If there is a labeling ls : [n]→ [d], we say that we drop label ls(i) and pick up
label ls(j), or that we pivot on label ls(i), specifying the index i when the label
ls(i) is not enough to identify it. The Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm is
given in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Lemke-Howson for Gale
input : A labeling ls : [n]→ [d], where d is even, such that there is a
completely labeled Gale string s0 ∈ G(d, n).
output: A Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) that s is completely labeled by ls,
such that s 6= s0.
1 choose a missing label k ∈ [d]
2 pivot on label k from s0 to s reaching a new 1 bit with label h
3 while h 6= k, so s is not completely labeled do
4 pivot away from the other 1 bit in s with label h from s to s′
5 let h be the label of the new 1 bit in s′
6 set s = s′
7 return s
The next example illustrates the correspondence between the Dual
Lemke-Howson Algorithm and the Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm.
Example 3.3. Figure 3.8 shows the cyclic polytope C4(6) with the labeling
lv(i) = i for i ∈ [4],
lv(5) = 3,
lv(6) = 2.
This corresponds to the labeling ls = 123432 for G(4, 6) given in Example
2.13, for which there are four completely labeled Gale strings: sA = 111100,
sB = 110110, sC = 100111 and sD = 101101. These, in turn, correspond to
the facets A, B, C and D of C4(6), that are exactly the completely labeled
facets for lv.
From the point of view of Gale strings, pivoting on label 3 from
sA = 111100 returns sB = 110110. Analogously, pivoting on label 3 from
facet A returns facet B.
58
AB
3
3
2
4
2
1
facet 1 2 3 4 3 2
A 1 1 1 1 0 0
B 1 1 0 1 1 0
facet 1 2 3 4 3 2
Figure 3.8 Pivoting on label 3 from sA = 111100 to sB = 110110 in the
Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm corresponds to the pivoting from
facet A (edges in green) to facet B (edges in blue) in the Dual Lemke
Path Algorithm.
The indices i = 1, 2, 4 correspond to the 2-dimensional intersection of
A and B (edges in pink).
The membership of Another Gale in the complexity class PPA follows
from an argument similar to Proposition 3.1. We give here the full proof that
it is in PPAD, following the exposition given in Merschen [19].
A permutation of elements of an ordered set S is a sequence without
repetition; this gives a rearrangement of the elements of S. A transposition
is a permutation of exactly two elements. The sign of a permutation is
sign(σ) = (−1)m, where m is the number of transpositions needed to get
the natural order σ0 = 1 . . . n from σ. It is immediate to see that any two
permutations that differ in only one transposition have opposite sign.
We define the sign of a completely labeled Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) as follows:
let l : [n]→ [d] be the labeling of G(d, n), and let l0 be the string of labels l(i)
such that s(i) = 1 and that two labels corresponding to a run in l are adjacent
in l0. Then we define sign(s) = sign(l0). Notice that if l(i) = i for i ∈ [d] then
the sign of the completely labeled Gale string 1d0(n−d) is always positive.
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The sign of an almost completely labeled Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) with
missing label k and duplicate label h is defined on two different strings. Let i1
be the index of h reached by the last pivot (the “new” position of the 1) and
let i2 be the index of h such that s(i2) = 1 before the last pivot (the “old”
position of the 1). Let l1 be the string obtained as l0 substituting k to h at
index i1, and let l2 be the string obtained as l0 substituting k to h at index i2.
Notice that sign(l1) = −sign(l2), since they can be obtained from each other
applying the transposition (kh).
Consider now the steps of the Lemke paths in the Lemke Path for Gale
Algorithm in the case where sign(s0) = +1; the negative case is analogous,
with opposite signs. If the first pivot returns another completely labeled Gale
string s, this must have negative sign because it has been obtained “jumping”
over an odd number of 1’s. For the same reason, if the pivoting returns an
almost completely labeled Gale string, we have that sign(l1) = −1, which
implies sign(l2) = +1. The next pivoting step drops the label h from index i2,
so again we change sign. This shows that the Lemke Path for Gale Algorithm
results in the sign of the completely and almost completely labeled Gale strings
“swinging” as in Table 3.9. Notice that all the steps of this construction can be
done in polynomial time. Orienting all Lemke paths from positive to negative
reduces the problem Another Gale to End Of The Line.
Proposition 3.3. The Lemke-Howson for Gale Algorithm 3 returns a solution
to the PPAD problem Another Gale. Furthermore, the number of completely
labeled Gale strings s ∈ G(d, n) is even, and the two completely labeled Gale
strings at opposite ends of any Lemke path have opposite sign.
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+ -
completely labeled
string
pivot
other 
label
pivot
completely labeled
string
pivot
...............
other 
label
almost completely 
labeled string
missing label
substituted in
new position
...............
almost completely 
labeled string
missing label
substituted in
new position
Figure 3.9 Sign switching of the Lemke Path for Gale Algorithm.
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Example 3.4. Let ls = 123432. Consider the Lemke path from the completely
labeled Gale string s = 111100 with missing label 4. Figure 3.10 shows the
graph of Table 3.9.
Notice that sign(101101) = sign(l(6)l(1)l(3)l(4)) = sign((2134)), since
s(6) = s(1) = 1 and therefore the indices 6 and 1 are consecutive in the same
run.
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 2 3     2
1 4 3     2
missing label 
in old position
2 1 4 3
positive sign
1 0 1 1 0 1
1   3 4   2
1   3 4   2
completely labeled
2 1 3 4
negative sign
+ -
 1 1 1 1 0 0
 1 2 3 4   
completely labeled
1 2 3 4
positive sign
pivot
other 
label
pivot
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 2 3     2  
1 2 3     4  
missing label 
in new position
4 1 2 3
negative sign
Figure 3.10 Pivoting with sign on the labeling l = 123432 for G(4, 6).
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Morris [20] has given an example of a labeling l : [2d] → [d] where the
length of the Lemke paths on the cyclic polytope Cd(2d) for the Lemke-Howson
Algorithm 1 grows exponentially in d for every missing label. These paths
are therefore also exponential on G(d, 2d) for the Lemke-Howson for Gale
Algorithm 3. Without repetitions of labels in consecutive positions, Morris’s
labeling is equivalent to the following:
l(k) = k for k ∈ [d],
l(d+ k) = d− k + 1 for k ∈ [d− 1] and even,
l(d+ k) = d− k − 1 for k ∈ [d− 1] and odd.
Example 3.5. Consider the labeling l = 1234564523 for G(6, 10). The only
two completely labeled Gale string are s = 11111100 and s′ = 10000011111.
Table 3.2 shows the Lemke path for missing label 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 4 5 2 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 4 5 2 3
Table 3.2 The Lemke path for the Morris labeling on G(4, 6) with missing label 1.
The bit position 1 that is dropped in the next pivoting step is underlined,
the bit 1 that has just been picked up is overlined.
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Savani and von Stengel [25] [26] extended Morris’ example in order to
construct a series of “hard to solve” games. Their results point to the importance
of studying the complexity of Another Gale to understand the complexity
of 2-Nash. Our main result, in the next section, will give a FP algorithm that
circumvents the problem of any exponential running time of the Lemke-Howson
for Gale Algorithm by using a very different approach.
3.3 The Complexity of Another Gale
A matching of a graph G = (V,E) is a set M ⊆ E such that every vertex
v ∈ V is the endpoint of at most one edge m ∈ M . A perfect matching is a
matching such that there is an edge m ∈ M incident to every vertex v ∈ V .
Edmonds [7] proved that the problem of finding a perfect matching is in FP.
Theorem 10. (Edmonds [7]) It takes polynomial time to find a perfect
matching of a graph or to decide that no such matching exists.
Theorem 10 can be easily extended to multigraphs, since a perfect matching
of a multigraph G corresponds to a perfect matching of the graph G′ obtained
taking only one edge whenever there are parallel edges in G.
Perfect Matching
input : A multigraph G = (V,E).
output: A perfect matching for G, or No if there is no possible perfect
matching for G.
Table 3.3 The problem Perfect Matching.
Proposition 3.4. Perfect Matching is in FP.
To prove our main result on Another Gale, we will prove that the related
problem Gale can be solved in polynomial time.
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Gale
input : A labeling l : [n]→ [d], where n > d.
output: A Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) that is completely labeled by l, or
No if no such string exists.
Table 3.4 The problem Gale.
Theorem 11. Gale is in FP.
Proof. Let us first consider the case of d even, with Gale strings s ∈ G(d, n)
as “wrapped-around strings”, that is, s(n + i) = s(i) and l(n + i) = l(i) for
all i ∈ [n].
Let G = (V,E) be the multigraph with V = [d], so that the vertices of G
correspond to the labels l(i) ∈ [d], and
E = { (l(i), l(i+ 1)) | i ∈ [n] }, (3.3)
so that there is an edge between two vertices if and only if the corresponding
labels are next to each other at some index i.
Let s ∈ G(d, n) be a completely labeled Gale string for l. By the Gale
evenness condition, every run of length k in s corresponds uniquely to k/2
disjoint pairs of indices (i, i+ 1) with s(i) = s(i+ 1) = 1. Let M be the set of
corresponding edges (l(i), l(i + 1)) in E. Since s is completely labeled, every
label l(i) ∈ [d] occurs at exactly one of the endpoints of an edge in M . Since
there are no repetitions of i’s in M , there is only one such edge. Hence, M is
a perfect matching of G.
Conversely, let M be a perfect matching for G = (V,E). Let s be the
bitstring with s(i) = s(i + 1) for every (l(i), l(i + 1)) ∈ M and s(i) = 0
otherwise. Since M is a matching, all the (l(i), l(i + 1)) ∈ M are disjoint,
so every run of s is of even length. Therefore s satisfies the Gale evenness
condition. Furthermore, since M is perfect, every vertex l(i) ∈ [d] is the
endpoint of an edge (l(i), l(i+ 1)) ∈M , therefore s is completely labeled.
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We now study the case of d odd. Let l′ : [n+ 1]→ [d+ 1] be the labeling
defined as in (2.18). Let G = (V,E) with V = [d+ 1] and
E = { (l(i), l(i+ 1)) | i ∈ [n] } ∪ {(l(n), d+ 1), (d+ 1, l(1))}. (3.4)
By the argument used in the case of d even, there is a completely labeled Gale
string s′ ∈ G(d+ 1, n+ 1) for l′ if and only G has a perfect matching.
Let s′ be a bitstring string of length n + 1, and let s = s′|[n], that is, the
bitstring of length n given by s(i) = s′(i) for i ∈ [n]. Since the only occurrence
of label d+ 1 in l′ is at index n+ 1, s is a completely labeled by l if and only
if s′ is completely labeled. Furthermore, if s′ is a Gale string then s is also a
Gale string, since the Gale evenness condition still holds in the internal runs.
Given a labeling l : [n] → [d] with d odd, it is therefore enough to apply
the algorithm given above in the case of even dimension to the corresponding
l′ : [n + 1] → [d + 1]. This returns a completely labeled Gale string s′, and
from that it is trivial to get a Gale string s = s′|[n] that is completely labeled
for l. Therefore, Gale for d odd reduces to the case of d even.
This proves that Gale reduces to the problem Perfect Matching of
Table 3.3 in polynomial time. Therefore, by Proposition 3.4, Gale is a
problem in FP.
It is interesting to notice that the graph G = (V,E) is an Euler graph,
since its edges have been defined following an Euler tour starting in l(1).
A polynomial-time algorithm to find a solution of an instance of Gale or
to decide that no such solution exists is given by Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4: Completely Labeled Gale String
input : A labeling l : [n]→ [d].
output: A Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) that is completely labeled by l, or
No if no such string exists.
1 if d odd then
2 Set “d originally odd” as True
3 Set d = d+ 1 and n = n+ 1
4 Set l′(i) = l(i) for i ∈ [n] and l(n+ 1) = d+ 1
5 Set l = l′
6 else
7 Set “d originally odd” as False
8 Set G = (V,E), with V = [d] and E = ∅
9 for i ∈ [n− 1] do
10 E = E ∪ {(l(i), l(i+ 1))}
11 E = E ∪ {(l(n), l(1))}
12 Run Edmonds’s Algorithm on G
13 if Edmonds’s Algorithm returns a perfect matching M of G then
14 set s = 0n
15 for (l(i), l(j)) ∈M do
16 Set s(i) = s(j) = 1
17 if “d originally odd” then
18 Set s = s|[n−1]
19 Return s
20 else
21 Return No
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Example 3.6. Figure 3.11 shows the graph for the Morris labeling
l = 1234564523, and its two matchings M = {e1, e3, e5} and M ′ = {e8, e6, e10}.
These, in turn, correspond to the completely labeled Gale strings
s = 1111110000 and s′ = 1000011111.
e10
e4
e2
e1
e5
e3
e8
e6
e7
e9
1
2
6
5
3 4
Figure 3.11 The perfect matchings for the Morris labeling l = 1234564523.
The matching M (in blue) corresponds to the completely labeled Gale
string s = 1111110000; the matching M ′ (in red) corresponds to the
string s′ = 1000011111.
The existence of a completely labeled Gale string is not guaranteed.
Example 3.7. Consider the labeling l = 121314. Figure 3.12 shows the
corresponding graph. It is easy to see that a perfect matching is not possible.
Analogously, as we have seen in Example 2.12, it’s not possible to find a
completely labeled Gale string for l.
e1
2e2
4
3
1
e5
e6
e4
e3
Figure 3.12 The graph for the labeling l = 121314. It’s impossible to find a perfect
matching. Analogously, there are no completely labeled Gale strings
for the labeling.
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Example 3.8. Let l = 12345243 be a labeling l : [n] → [d] where d = 5, odd.
The corresponding labeling on an even d as in the proof of Theorem 11 is
l′ = 123452436. Figure 3.13 shows the graph G. The matchings correspond
to the completely labeled Gale strings s1 = 11111000, s2 = 101111 00,
s3 = 10001111 and s4 = 11011001.
1
6
43
2
5
matching 1 2 3 4 5 2 3 3 6
M1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
M2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
M3 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
M4 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Figure 3.13 The perfect matchings for the graph associated to the labeling
l = 12345243 and the corresponding labeling on d+ 1.
The matching M1 (green), M2 (blue), M3 (red) and M4 correspond
respectively to the completely labeled Gale strings s1 = 11111000,
s2 = 101111 00, s3 = 10001111 and s4 = 11011001.
We finally extend the proof of Theorem 11 to give the complexity of
Another Gale.
Theorem 12. Another Gale is in FP.
Proof. By Proposition 2.4, it is enough to prove the result for d even.
Let G = (V,E) be the graph corresponding to the labeling l : [n]→ [d] with
V = [d] and E as in (3.3). Let M0 be the perfect matching of G corresponding
to the completely labeled Gale string s0 ∈ G(d, n).
Theorem 3.3 guarantees the existence of another completely labeled Gale
string s 6= s0, therefore of a corresponding perfect matching M 6= M0. Since
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M 6= M0, there is at least one edge e ∈M0 such that e /∈M . Consider the d/2
graphs Gi = (V,Ei), where Ei = E \ {ei} for ei ∈ M0. Since V (G) = V (Gi)
and E(Gi) ⊂ E(G), a perfect matching Mi of Gi is a perfect matching for G
as well. We have that ei /∈Mi ⊂ Ei but ei ∈M0. Therefore Mi 6= M0.
There are exactly d/2 possible Gi’s. By Proposition 10, finding a perfect
matching or deciding that there is none takes polynomial time for each Gi.
Therefore, Another Gale reduces to the problem Perfect Matching of
Table 3.3 in polynomial time, and by Proposition 3.4 it belongs to FP.
Notice that, in the case of d odd, the matchings M0 and M always differ in
at least one edge that is neither (l(n), d+1) nor (d+1, l(1)), since these are the
only two edges incident on the vertex v = d+ 1. Given a labeling l : [n]→ [d]
and a completely labeled Gale string s0 ∈ G(d, n), Algorithm 5 returns a Gale
string s 6= s0 that is completely labeled by l in polynomial time.
Applying Theorem 2.3 to Theorem 12 we have our main result: Gale
Nash is in FP, under the assumption that the construction of the game from
a cyclic polytope is given.
Theorem 13. Finding a Nash equilibrium of a Gale game takes polynomial
time.
70
Algorithm 5: Another Gale String
input : A labeling l : [n]→ [d] and a Gale string s0 ∈ G(d, n) that is
completely labeled by l.
output: A Gale string s ∈ G(d, n), completely labeled by l, such that
s 6= s0.
1 if d odd then
2 Set “d originally odd” as True
3 Set d = d+ 1 and n = n+ 1
4 Set l′(i) = l(i) for i ∈ [n] and l(n+ 1) = d+ 1
5 Set l = l′
6 Set s′0(i) = s0(i) for i ∈ [n] and s′0(n+ 1) = 1
7 Set s0 = s
′
0
8 else
9 Set “d originally odd” as False
10 Set G = (V,E) as in Algorithm 4
11 Set M0 as the matching corresponding to s0
12 for m ∈M0 do
13 Em = E \ {m}
14 Run Edmonds’s Algorithm on Gm = (V,Em)
15 if Edmonds’s Algorithm returns a perfect matching Mm of Gm
then
16 Set s = 0n
17 for (l(i), l(j)) ∈Mm do
18 Set s(i) = s(j) = 1
19 if “d originally odd” then
20 Set s = s|[n]
21 return s
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Example 3.9. Consider the Morris graph of Example 3.6, associated to the
labeling l = 1234564523. Suppose that Edmonds’s algorithm returns the
perfect matching M0 = {e1, e3, e5}, as in Figure 3.14 left, corresponding to
the completely labeled Gale string s0 = 1111110000. If we delete the edge e1,
we obtain the graph G1, as in Figure 3.14 center. The graph G1 has a perfect
matching M = {e6, e8, e10}, as in Figure 3.14 right. This is also a perfect
matching of G, corresponding to s = 1000011111, the only other completely
labeled Gale string for l.
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e10
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1
e10
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Figure 3.14 Left: The Morris graph G = (V,E) and its matching M0 = {e1, e3, e5}.
Center: The graph G1 = (V (G), E(G) \ {e1}).
Right: The matching M = {e6, e8, e10} is a perfect matching of both
G1 and G.
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Chapter 4
Further results
Algorithm 5 allows us to find a Nash equilibrium of a Gale game in polynomial
time starting from another equilibrium (usually the artificial one), but it
ignores the relationship of these equilibria as endpoints of the Lemke-Howson
algorithm. In particular, it does not give any information about the index
of the equilibrium (we mentioned the concept in Section 3.2, for a clear
introduction see Shapley [27] and Ve´gh and von Stengel [28]). Following the
construction in Proposition 3.3, we can reduce the problem “given a Nash
equilibrium of a Gale game, find another one of opposite index” to thePPADS
problem Opposite Sign Gale of Table 4.1.
Opposite Sign Gale
input : A labeling l : [n] → [d] and a completely labeled Gale string
s0 ∈ G(d, n).
output: A completely labeled Gale string s ∈ G(d, n) such that
sign(s) = −sign(s0).
Table 4.1 The problem Opposite Sign Gale.
A polynomial-time algorithm for Opposite Sign Gale where the labeling
for which the Gale graph G = (V,E) in (3.3) is planar has been given by
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Merschen [19]; the result for any labeling has been given by Ve´gh and von
Stengel [28]. The latter uses the definition of a general framework to deal with
pivoting algorithms, called Complementary Pivoting with Direction Algorithm.
This is defined not only for perfect matchings of a Gale graph, but for the wider
class of room partitions of Euler complexes, first introduced by Edmonds [8]
and Edmonds and Sanita` [9].
A d-dimensional Euler complex (in the following: d-oik) is C = (V,R),
where V is a finite set of nodes and R is a family of of subsets Ri of V , called
rooms, such that |Ri| = d for all i and any set of d − 1 nodes (called a wall)
is contained in an even number of rooms. A room partitioning M of (V,R) is
a subset M of R such that each node v ∈ V is in exactly one room Ri ∈ M .
An example is given in Figure 4.1: an octahedron where the nodes are the
vertices and the rooms are the facets. Edmonds and Sanita` used an Exchange
Algorithm and a parity argument analogous to Proposition 3.1 to show that
there is an even number of room partitions of an oik. Figure 4.2 shows an
example of the Exchange Algorithm on the octahedron of Figure 4.1.
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D1
D2
B2
B1
A2
A1
C1
C2
6 4
2
1
53
Figure 4.1 An octahedron as an Euler complex and its room partitions, considering
the vertices as nodes and the facets as rooms.
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A2
B1
6 5
1
4
32
B2
B2
A1
A2
6 5
1
B2
32
4
Figure 4.2 Top: Pivot on vertex 1 from room B1 to room A2. The new vertex 4 is
duplicate, as it appears in room A2 and room B2.
Bottom: Pivot on the duplicate vertex 4 from the old room B2 to room
A1. This picks up up the missing vertex, and concludes the algorithm.
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In the case where the rooms in the oik are defined as the sets of facets
incident to the vertices of the best response polytopes of a bimatrix game
and the room partitions correspond to completely labeled vertex pairs, the
Lemke-Howson Algorithm is a special case of the Exchange Algorithm. A
simpler example of oik is an Euler graph, considering its vertices as nodes and
its edges as rooms; then the walls are its vertices, and the room partitions
are given by its perfect matchings. As mentioned before, the Gale graph
used in the proof of Theorem 11 and Theorem 12 is an Euler graph. This
points towards a further connection between oiks and the topic of our study.
Unfortunately, this connection is less trivial than it appears at first, as it can
be seen by looking once more into the issue of sign.
Example 4.1. Consider a octahedron with a labeling as in Figure 4.3 (left).
The endpoints of the Lemke paths in the Dual Lemke-Howson Algorithm 2
are shown in Figure 4.3 (right). Notice that this graph is bipartite: this
corresponds to the division between facets with positive and negative sign.
This, in turn, can be proven by a parity argument with sign used in the proof
that Another Completely Labeled Facet is PPAD, similar to the proof
of Proposition 3.3 for Another Gale.
On the other hand, consider an octahedron from the point of view of room
partitions, as given in Figure 4.1 (left). Notice that only the rooms matter,
not the labels assigned to the vertices. The graph describing the endpoints of
the Exchange Algorithm, analogous to Figure 4.3 (right), is shown in Figure
4.4 (right) and it is not bipartite. Giving a sign to the room partitions cannot
be done simply through Edmonds’s Exchange Algorithm.
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dropping label 2 and 3
dropping label 1
A B
D C
Figure 4.3 Left: The completely labeled facets of a labeled octahedron.
Right: The endpoints of the Lemke paths.
D
B
C
A
1
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dropping vertex 2 or 6
dropping vertex 1 or 4
dropping vertex 3 or 5
A D
B C
Figure 4.4 Left: The room partitions of an octahedron.
Right: The endpoints of the Exchange Algorithm.
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Ve´gh and von Stengel [28] proved that the endpoints of the Complementary
Pivoting with Direction Algorithm have opposite orientation as long as the
room partitions are defined on an oriented oik, where the order of the rooms
in the partition matters if the dimension d of the oik matters if d is odd.
If d is even, as in the case of perfect matchings of an Euler graph, the
order of the rooms does not matter. The parity result follows similar to
the previous cases. Unfortunately, as for the Lemke-Howson Algorithm, the
Complementary Pivoting with Direction Algorithm may take exponential
time in the general case. Despite this, Ve´gh and von Stengel [28] give a
near-linear-time algorithm that, given a perfect matching of an Euler graph,
finds a perfect matching of opposite sign. This allows to find a solution to
Opposite Sign Gale in polynomial time.
The wider issue of the complexity of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm has
been solved by Goldberg, Papadimitriou and Savani [15] asPSPACE-complete.
From a more general point of view, Fearnley and Savani [10] have proven that
it is PSPACE-complete to find a solution that is computed by a pivoting
method, such as the simplex algorithm. This invites, once more, a further
investigation of exchange-like algorithms to construct “hard to solve” games.
Since restricting to games that can be reduced to oiks of dimension 2 seems to
give games that are, after all, easily solvable, a possible direction for research
could be the study of games based on oiks of dimension 3 or higher. Studying
products of these could also be interesting, although the use of products of
polytopes to make the solvability via enumeration support harder in Savani
and von Stengel [25] was circumvented together with the simpler case of Gale
games by our result.
A further complexity-related result in the case of Gale games is given in
Merschen [19]: finding the number of equilibria of a Gale game is#P-complete.
Gilboa and Zemel [13] have proven that deciding the uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium is a co-NP-complete problem. A proof from the point of view of
79
completely labeled facets of a polytope was given by von Stengel [31]. Also
in [31], von Stengel proved that the finding a completely labeled facet in a
generic labeled polytope is NP-complete. Given these results, it could be
interesting to find a polynomial-time algorithm to decide the uniqueness of
Nash equilibria in Gale games, or to find yet another open borderline case for
the complexity of normal-form games in a more general framework.
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There is life outside mathematics, despite the tales of PhD Comics, and
some of it is wonderful. Cristiana has been giving me comfort and tea day
and night, no matter how desperate I was. Paolo has been a light in dark
times, and his “cicoria” are words to live by. Violetta has given a space to
my writing, and put up with too many silences. Alessandro is more than the
Avvocato Laser. Stefano has given me hope for the future.
I wouldn’t have known how beautiful theorems can be without my mother,
and I would probably know more about giving up without my father.
A lifetime will not be enough to thank my husband Emmanuele; I’ll keep
it short here and have a longer dinner.
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